





LEARNING FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

Michael W. Hulet
NASA
Johnson Space Center




Introduction

The goal of this presentation is to examine what we can extrapolate from previous Lessons Learned attempts and suggest possible improvements.




Background

- Modernization project involving risk management & program assurance tasks
- Electrical near-fatality MIB identified 2 similar previous occurrences in the same facility
- Gulfstream III aircraft engine overheating
- Unexpected odor in the EMU




Communication Techniques

- Mr. Griffin's emails contain pointers
- Mr. O'Connor publicizes good reports
- HQ Mishap POC emails mishap highlights to Center POCs




Communication Techniques (cont.)

- JSC Website has a Close Call database
- JSC Hazard Abatement Process on-line
- JSC Sr. Staff Page has mishap report links
- JSC Management Council Briefings



Communication Techniques (cont.)

- Some JSC Directorates have email lists for initial mishap reporting
- JSC Safety Alert
- WSTF has a link to on-site mishap reports on the homepage



Close Calls

- Nitrogen Asphyxiation
- MIWG MISHAP
- Galileo Moisture Damage



Close Call Web Site

Safety & Health - Microsoft Internet Explorer

Address: <http://www6.jsc.nasa.gov/safety/CloseCalls/>

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

JSC Safety & Health

Home Alerts Checklists Close Calls Committees Hazards Inspections

Links Mishaps PEP Survey Publications Training VPP Contacts

JSC Close Call Information

General Information

- [Close Call Reporting Form and Instructions](#)
- [STOP IT - \(How to Prevent Mishaps\)](#)
- [Top Level Process](#)
- [Quick Look Guidelines for Investigating Close Calls](#)
- [Detailed Guidelines for Investigating Close Calls](#)

Close Call Survey Results


- [2-Year Close Call Survey Results](#)

JSC Close Call Highlights


- [Close Calls Highlights \(10-01-07 to 03-31-07\)](#) - posted 04/02/2007
- [Close Calls Highlights \(07-01-06 to 09-30-06\)](#) - posted 10/02/2006
- [Close Calls Highlights \(04-01-06 to 06-30-06\)](#) - posted 10/02/2006
- [Close Calls Highlights \(01-01-06 to 03-31-06\)](#) - posted 04/03/2006
- [Close Calls Highlights \(10-01-05 to 12-31-05\)](#) - posted 01/04/2006
- [Close Calls Highlights \(07-01-05 to 09-30-05\)](#) - posted 10/03/2005
- [Close Calls Highlights \(04-01-05 to 06-30-05\)](#) - posted 07/14/2005
- [Close Calls Highlights \(01-01-05 to 03-31-05\)](#) - posted 07/14/2005
- [Close Calls Highlights \(04-01-04 to 12-09-04\)](#) - posted 12/09/2004
- [Close Calls Highlights \(12-03-03 to 04-30-04\)](#) - posted 06/14/2004
- [Close Calls Highlights \(04-01-03 to 12-09-03\)](#) - posted 12/16/2003
- [Close Calls Highlights \(01-01-02 to 12-31-02\)](#) - posted 02/05/2003
- [Close Calls Highlights \(01-01-02 to 11-12-02\)](#) - posted 11/18/2002
- [Close Calls Highlights \(01-01-02 to 10-10-02\)](#) - posted 10/10/2002
- [Close Calls Highlights \(01-01-02 to 05-30-02\)](#)
- [2001 Close Calls Highlights](#)
- [1999 Close Calls Highlights](#)
- [1998 Close Calls Highlights](#)
- [1997 Close Calls Highlights](#)
- [1996 Close Calls Highlights](#)
- [1994 - 1995 Close Calls Highlights](#)


Done

start Inb... Saf... Ne... ME... Bull... BIT... Saf... Saf... Po... Mic... Saf... 1:22 PM



JSC's Top Level Close Call Process Flow






Hazard Abatement Tracking System (HATS)

What is the HATS?

Why do we have a HATS?

Who maintains the HATS?


- The Occupational Safety Team, NS2



Porcelain Press


(What's Wrong with this Picture)






Possible General Improvements

- Verification of flow-down efforts for findings (lateral and down). This should include all communication efforts.
- Is the the LLIS on-line location publicity geared to both to design engineers and facility safety engineers?




Design Improvements

- Is configuration management part of the process?
- How closely do the system safety analysts and the quality control assurance people work?




MIB Improvements

- Looking at possible communication improvements
- Are the same issues that restrict initiating MIBs also a problem with identifying and communicating findings?




Summary

- NASA has a history of repeating mishaps
- Various tools to mitigate risk
- Communication opportunities available to prevent repetitive incidents
- We need to do a better job of protecting NASA people, programs, facilities, and the public from NASA incidents



Summary (cont.)

- Things to consider before and after mishaps
- What have we done to improve our efforts to communicate lessons learned?
- Heighten awareness of the Lessons Learned Information System



Summary (cont.)

- The final analysis of the effectiveness in using Lessons Learned is how diligently we use them